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Chapter 6 
THE GOVERNANCE OF INDIGENOUS HEALTH 
Constance MacIntosh* 
State governance of Indigenous health in Canada is burdened by inequitable 
administrative structures and policy-based arrangements which were born of 
eras that denied the right of Indigenous peoples to self-govern. Although no 
longer resting on explicitly racist premises, this governance regime remains only 
partially aligned with Indigenous understandings of health and well-being. 
Moreover, no federal entity has assumed responsibility for a national 
governance structure, nor have the provinces and territories committed to a 
comprehensive governance structure to foster Indigenous health. The result is a 
cumbersome series of programs and policies with varying criteria for access, 
even among Indigenous populations within the same region. Governance of 
Indigenous health lacks the foundational principles that otherwise underpin 
health care governance in Canada.1 
The unique constitutional dimensions of Indigenous status further challenge 
coherence in the system. These dimensions both overlap with and go beyond 
questions about state jurisdiction and obligations. From the perspective of the 
federal and provincial governments, Indigenous peoples are residents of 
provinces. As such, they have the same rights as any other resident to 
provincially insured health care services.2 However, pursuant to section 91(24) 
of the Constitution Act, 1867,3  the federal government has jurisdiction over 
“Indians, and lands reserved for the Indians”. Under this head of power, the 
federal government could and has played a role in supporting the health of 
people who are “Indians”.4 In practice, however, while the federal government 
provides health-related support for some First Nations people and Inuit, many 
Indigenous peoples are excluded from its Indigenous-specific health care 
supports. These “jurisdictional wasteland[s]”, where neither the federal nor                                                         
* This chapter benefitted from excellent research support by Kate Scallion, and was further 
strengthened by the sharp insights that were offered by editor Joanna Erdman. 
1  For example, the Canada Health Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-6 identifies four foundational principles 
that are to structure all provincial health care regimes if those regimes are to receive transfer 
payments. See Chapter 3, The Role of Law in the Rise and Fall of Canadian Medicare, in this 
volume.  
2  See, e.g., Health Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.6, s. 11; Canada Health Act, R.S.C. 1985, 
c. C-6, s. 2. 
3  (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3. 
4  The nature and scope of this role was recently considered in Daniels v. Canada (Indian Affairs 
and Northern Development), [2016] S.C.J. No. 12, 2016 SCC 12 (S.C.C.) and is discussed 
further below.  
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provincial government will assume responsibility for Indigenous-specific health 
care, result in egregious health care gaps for Indigenous peoples.5 
While Indigenous individuals and communities seek improved state-
government support for health, they also seek it on their own terms. The right of 
Indigenous peoples to be actively involved in state government decisions about 
health and well-being is clearly supported by international law.6  Indigenous 
control over Indigenous health governance is further motivated by the co-
relation between Indigenous self-determination and Indigenous well-being,7 a 
critical finding in light of the fact that Indigenous peoples’ health, looked at 
from a wide variety of factors, consistently lags far behind that of non-
Indigenous peoples in Canada.8  
This chapter explores these dynamics of Indigenous health governance in 
Canada. It opens by describing how Indigenous peoples have successfully used 
constitutional arguments to assert their own vision of well-being, within the 
broader context of colonial oppression and attempts to erase Indigenous 
knowledge and culture. The chapter then tracks federal initiatives on Indigenous 
health, in their design and outcomes, and how they evolved into the 
contemporary state governance regime. The next part turns to provincial and 
self-government initiatives that have expanded, but also complicated, 
Indigenous health governance in Canada. The chapter closes by considering 
different ways in which provinces, territories and First Nations governments 
approach the regulation of traditional healers and midwives.9 In an effort to 
recognize the human lives at the centre of state governance regimes, the chapter 
embeds stories of Indigenous children, their health and lives, within its 
exploration of Canadian law and policy on Indigenous health.  
                                                        
5  Ibid., at para. 14; Constance MacIntosh, “Jurisdictional Roulette: Constitutional and Structural 
Barriers to Aboriginal Access to Health” in Colleen M. Flood, ed., Just Medicare: What’s in, 
What’s Out, How We Decide (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006) 193.  
6  United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN GAOR, 61st Sess., Doc 
A/RES/61/295 (October 2, 2007) arts. 21, 23-24. 
7  Bonita Beatty, “Indigenous Health Governance and UNDRIP” in The Internationalization of 
Indigenous Rights: UNDRIP in the Canadian Context — Special Report (Waterloo: Centre for 
International Governance Innovation, 2014) 49; Michael Murphy, “Self-Determination as a 
Collective Capability: The Case of Indigenous Peoples” (2014) 15:4 J. of Human Development 
& Capabilities 320; Kiera Ladner, “Understanding the Impact of Self-Determination on 
Communities in Crisis” (2009) 5:2 J. of Aboriginal Health 88. 
8  Constance MacIntosh, “Indigenous Peoples and Health Law and Policy: Responsibilities and 
Obligations” in Jocelyn Downie, Timothy Caulfield & Colleen M. Flood, eds., Canadian Health 
Law and Policy, 4th ed. (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2011) 575 at 597-609.  
9  This flow resonates with the four eras of policy that are described by Josée G. Lavoie, Evelyn L. 
Forget & Annette J. Browne, “Caught at the Crossroad: First Nations, Health Care, and the 
Legacy of the Indian Act” (2010) 8(1) Pimatisiwin: A Journal of Aboriginal and Indigenous 
Community Health 83. Other authors identify two eras, see e.g., Miranda D. Kelly, “Toward a 
New Era of Policy: Health Care Service Delivery to First Nations” (2011) 2:1 The International 
Indigenous Policy Journal, Article 11. 
 The Governance of Indigenous Health 137 
A. UNDERSTANDING THE POLITICAL PRESENT 
THROUGH THE LIVED PAST  
“J.J.” and Makayla Sault are 11-year old Mohawk (Kamienkahagen) girls, who 
with their families, rejected western medical recommendations in assertion of a 
different vision of how to live and die well.  
As reported in Hamilton Health Sciences Corp. v. H. (D.), J.J. was 
diagnosed with acute lymphoblastic leukemia in August 2014.10 Her physicians 
asserted a 90 to 95 per cent chance that chemotherapy would cure her cancer.11 
J.J. underwent 11 days of chemotherapy before her mother, D.H., withdrew 
consent for the chemotherapy in pursuit of an alternative course of treatment that 
drew upon traditional Aboriginal health care practices. D.H.’s First Nations 
Band supported her decision as an exercise of Aboriginal rights protected under 
the Constitution Act, 1982. 12  Against D.H.’s decision to withdraw consent, 
McMaster Children’s Hospital sought a court order to have J.J. declared a child 
in need of protection, which would permit Brant Child and Family Services to 
seize J.J. and resume chemotherapy. They believed this would be in the child’s 
best interests. The judge who heard the application, Edward J., declined to make 
the order. He wrote “I cannot find that J.J. is a child in need of protection when 
her substitute decision-maker has chosen to exercise her constitutionally 
protected right to pursue their traditional medicine over the applicant’s stated 
course of treatment of chemotherapy.”13  
Like J.J., Makayla Sault from the Mississaugas of the New Credit First 
Nation was a Mohawk girl of 11 who was diagnosed with acute lymphoblastic 
leukemia, in March of 2014. Makayla sought to discontinue chemotherapy to 
pursue alternative treatment including traditional Aboriginal medicines. Legal 
intervention by Brant Family and Children’s Services was again considered in 
this case, but Makayla was found to have fully understood the nature of her 
condition and to have the capacity to make her own treatment choice, even if 
from the perspective of western medicine, this choice would likely culminate in 
a preventable death. When Makayla relapsed, she chose not to resume 
chemotherapy and died two months later in January 2015. When J.J.’s cancer 
returned, D.H. re-commenced chemotherapy, while having J.J. continue to 
participate in traditional Aboriginal healing practices. 
These stories, of the refusal of western medicine and its authority, for 
traditional Aboriginal health care practice, provoked a heated and polarizing 
debate. Most of those who disagreed with the ruling of Edward J. in Hamilton 
Health Sciences Corp. v. H. (D.) framed the core issue as a conflict between a 
child’s right to life and constitutionalized Indigenous rights, which tilted                                                         
10  [2014] O.J. No. 5419, 2014 ONCJ 603 (Ont. C.J.) [hereinafter “Hamilton Health Sciences”], as 
amended by [2015] O.J. No. 2214, 2015 ONCJ 229 [hereinafter “Joint Endorsement”] (all 
concur about the nature of the general flow). 
11  Hamilton Health Sciences, at paras. 1-3. 
12  Being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
13  Hamilton Health Sciences, at para. 83. 
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decisively in favour of pursuing medically indicated treatment that was 
predicted to preserve life. In deciding otherwise, health care providers criticized 
the court as betraying the Indigenous community, that “we as a society have 
failed these girls; this failure undermines the trust and respect that the 
Aboriginal community so importantly deserves.” 14  Those who agreed with 
Edward J.’s decision tended to argue that Indigenous patients should have the 
right to access both western and Indigenous healing practices, with the freedom 
to choose between them.15 One Mohawk physician characterized the issue as not 
being about medical choice, but of political self-determination: “[T]his is not 
just about medical choice … . This is about indigenous people reclaiming their 
wholeness as people. This isn’t about religion; it isn’t about choice. It’s about 
being who we are.”16 
The stories of J.J. and Makayla show that health governance occupies a 
highly charged interface between state and Indigenous governance. These stories 
speak to profound differences of perspective and practice in what it means to 
live (and potentially die) well, differences not just epistemological but also 
paradigmatic. Indigenous individuals and communities in and through health 
care engage in practices of legal and political resurgence, a conscious resistance 
to being captured by and subsumed within western values and legal regimes.  
In their submissions before the court in Hamilton Health Sciences Corp., 
the Band argued that D.H.’s decision to withdraw consent for her daughter’s 
chemotherapy was an exercise of Aboriginal rights, recognized and affirmed by 
section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.17 Over the last 30 years, the meaning 
of this provision has been interpreted many times, but usually in the context of 
conflicts over resources to protect against an otherwise legitimate exercise of 
state power that unduly infringes on the modern day exercise of historically 
sourced practices, customs or traditions identified as integral to the culture of an 
Aboriginal people.18 Before this case, section 35(1) had never been invoked to 
protect a treatment decision in the health care context.  
Edward J. affirmed the claim and held that Aboriginal healing practices are 
protected by section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 and as such reasoned 
that:                                                          
14  Conrad Fernandez, et al., Letter to the Editor, “Protecting the welfare of all Canadian children” 
(January 27, 2015) C.M.A.J., online: http://www.cmaj.ca/content/187/3/162.full/reply#cmaj_el_ 
727917. 
15  Laura Eggerston, “Doctors Should Collaborate with Traditional Healers” (2015) 187:5 C.M.A.J. 
E153, online: http://www.cmaj.ca/content/187/5/E153.full; Lisa Richardson & Matthew B. 
Stanbrook, “Caring for Aboriginal Patients Requires Trust and Respect, Not Courtrooms”, 
Editorial (2015) 187:3 C.M.A.J. 162, online: http://www.cmaj.ca/content/187/3/162.full. 
16  Dr. Karen Hill as quoted in Eggerston, ibid., at E153. 
17  Hamilton Health Sciences Corp., at para. 62. 
18  See R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] S.C.J. No. 77, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 at para. 65 (S.C.C.). For a 
discussion of how the historically based customs are recognized as necessarily evolving to 
remain relevant within the contemporary moment, see R. v. Sappier; R. v. Gray, [2006] S.C.J. 
No. 54, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 686 (S.C.C.).  
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I cannot find that J.J. is a child in need of protection when her substitute 
decision-maker has chosen to exercise her constitutionally protected right to 
pursue their traditional medicine over the applicant’s stated course of treatment 
of chemotherapy.19  
Moreover, Edward J. refused to condition or otherwise qualify that right on the 
validation of western medical science.20 He wrote: 
D.H.’s decision to pursue traditional medicine for her daughter J.J. is her 
[A]boriginal right. Further, such a right cannot be qualified as a right only if it 
is proven to work by employing the western medical paradigm. To do so would 
be to leave open the opportunity to perpetually erode [A]boriginal rights.21 
Edward J. did not clearly state whether any other ground in the health care 
context could justifiably limit the right. Under section 35(1), an infringement of 
Aboriginal rights can be justified if undertaken for a sufficiently compelling and 
valid legislative purpose, and in a manner consistent with the Crown’s fiduciary 
duty (which is often illustrated by showing, for example, that there was 
meaningful consultation when the legal regime was developed, and any 
outstanding infringement was shaped to be minimally impairing).22 In a follow-
up set of reasons, Edward J. referenced how section 35(1) Aboriginal rights are 
exercised within a layered legal context, and gestured toward a justification 
standard for their infringement. He wrote that “the Aboriginal right to use 
traditional medicine … must be considered, among other factors, in any analysis 
of the best interests of the child”23 while also emphasizing that a core tenet of 
Haudenosaunee culture is “the ultimate respect accorded to their children”.24 
One reading of this statement is that the constitutionally protected Aboriginal 
right is subsumed within a statutory or common law best interests of the child 
test. Another reading is that the Aboriginal right is always presumptively 
exercised in line with cultural values that already prioritize the child’s best 
interests.  
J.J. and her mother, D.H., left the jurisdiction before the application in their 
case was heard. D.H. may have left because she did not trust that the Canadian 
legal system would value or respect her choice. She may have rejected the very 
proposition that the state could legitimately claim to know or understand her 
child’s best interests and thus pursue them. The history of Indigenous health 
governance in Canada supports such suspicions. This history cannot be divorced 
from the larger context in which it is embedded. That context has been thick 
with practices to promote cultural assimilation, undermine Indigenous legal and 
political structures, and actively devalue Indigenous knowledge about matters                                                         
19  Hamilton Health Sciences Corp., at para. 83. 
20  Ibid., at paras. 81-82. 
21  Ibid., at para. 81.   
22  R. v. Sparrow, [1990] S.C.J. No. 49, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 at 1113 (S.C.C.). 
23  Joint Endorsement, Appendix at para. 83a. 
24  Ibid., at para. 4. 
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that include healing practices and how to pass culture from one generation to the 
next.  
Early relations between settlers and Indigenous peoples were marked by 
nation-to-nation agreements to enable peaceful co-existence and commitments 
from European states to protect Indigenous peoples from interference from their 
settler population. 25  However, this dynamic shifted with settler populations 
expanding and Indigenous populations becoming weaker due to introduced 
diseases decimating communities and the loss of traditional food sources such as 
buffalo. Within this context, the dominion government asserted de facto control 
over the lives of Indigenous peoples and their lands in many regions of Canada. 
Its vision of the relationship between Indigenous political communities and itself 
was epitomized in the Constitution Act, 1867, in which “Indians” were 
audaciously deigned to be a subject of federal jurisdiction along with the postal 
service and navigational buoys.26  
The opening paragraphs of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s 
report on Indian Residential Schools identifies how, for “over a century, the 
central goals of Canada’s Aboriginal policy” included causing “Aboriginal 
peoples to cease to exist as distinct legal, social, cultural, religious, and racial 
entities in Canada.”27 Children who had been seized from their parents and taken 
to Indian Residential Schools fell victim to and died from highly contagious 
illnesses for which the government was unwilling to provide adequate care and 
for which the government repeatedly blamed the children’s genetic make-up.28 
Some children were returned to the communities when they were close to death, 
and thus acted as unwitting vectors for spreading illness. Recent revelations 
verified that Indigenous children at residential schools were used as test subjects 
for medical experiments for vaccines.29 
The devastation inflicted by introduced disease explains why treaties 
negotiated at the end of the 19th century — when residential schools were 
introduced — involved assurances that Indigenous signatories would have 
access to European healing knowledge and practices.30  The treaties did not                                                         
25  Canada, Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, 1752 Peace and Friendship Treaty, online: 
https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100029040/1100100029041; Treaty of Niagara, 1764; 
Royal Proclamation, 1763 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 1. 
26  (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, ss. 91(24), 91(5), 91(9). 
27  Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, “Canada’s Residential Schools: The History, 
Part 1 – Origins to 1939” in TRC Final Report, vol. 1 (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2015) at 3. 
28  Ibid., at 379, 395, 410-413.  
29  Ibid., at 423. 
30  Canada, Indigenous and Northern Affairs, Treaty No. 6 between Her Majesty the Queen and the 
Plain and Wood Cree Indians and other Tribes of Indians at Fort Carleton, Fort Pitt and Battle 
River with Adhesions (1876), online: http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100028710/ 
1100100028783, refers to the Queen granting assistance in the case of pestilence, and of 
providing a “medicine chest”. Records support similar assurances having been negotiated during 
at least four other treaties. See Constance MacIntosh, “Indigenous Peoples and Health Law and 
Policy: Responsibilities and Obligations” in Jocelyn Downie, Timothy Caulfield & Colleen M. 
Flood, eds., Canadian Health Law and Policy, 4th ed. (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2011) 575 at 591.  
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involve the Indigenous signatories agreeing to abandon their healing practices. 
Nonetheless, the federal government has consistently refused to recognize any 
responsibility for health support as a manifestation of health-based treaty rights, 
leading in some instances to treaty signatories litigating for health care 
supports.31  
The overall relationship between the Canadian state and Indigenous peoples 
has been historically dominated by prejudice. Indigenous peoples were cast by 
the state as “wards” who needed evolutionary guidance to leave their 
Indigeneity behind and adopt the knowledge, values and practices of the 
Europeans.32 The project of erasing Indigenous people’s cultural and political 
identity, including their healing practices, was enacted through criminal 
legislation, policy and everyday persecutory practice. 33  This enabled a new 
status quo where the majority of Indigenous healers were forced to abandon 
their practices, and Western healing practices became dominant as the only 
legitimate approach to health and healing.34 The historic and continuing harms 
of colonialism’s epistemological legacy lends nuance to Edward J.’s refusal in 
Hamilton Health Sciences Corp. to give deciding weight to western medicine’s                                                         
31  A 1935 decision found the treaty promise extended to “all the medicines, drugs, or medical 
supplies which they might need free of charge”: Dreaver v. R. (1935), 5 C.N.L.R. 92 (Ex. Ct.). 
Litigation during the 1960s and ’70s found the language of the treaty limited the provision to 
medication, and also rendered it discretionary: R. v. Johnston, [1966] S.J. No. 220, 56 D.L.R. 
(2d) 749 (Sask. C.A.); R. v. Swimmer, [1970] S.J. No. 272, 17 D.L.R. (3d) 476 (Sask. C.A.). 
Judicial commentary from 1999, however, reflected the principles of treaty interpretation that 
had developed under section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the 
Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, which, among other principles, requires contextualizing 
the terms of treaty documents and recognizing that Indigenous signatories were unable to review 
the documents to ensure their honest recital of the agreement. The more recent cases were 
identified as likely wrongly decided, and the treaty right was described as likely extending to “a 
full range of contemporary medical services”: Wuskwi Sipihk Cree Nation v. Canada (Minister 
of National Health and Welfare), [1999] F.C.J. No. 82, [1999] 4 C.N.L.R. 293 at para. 14 
(F.C.T.D.).  
32  St. Catharines Milling & Lumber Co. v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1887] S.C.J. No. 3, 13 
S.C.R. 577 (S.C.C.). For a discussion of how evolutionary theory informed Canadian colonial 
legislation regarding Indigenous peoples, see Constance MacIntosh, “From Judging Culture to 
Taxing ‘Indians’: Tracing the Legal Discourse of the ‘Indian Mode of Life’” (2009) 47:3 
Osgoode Hall L.J. 399 at 405-421. 
33  For example, legislation was passed to ban important cultural ceremonies, which played the role 
of cementing obligations, enabling spiritual well-being and healing, within Indigenous 
communities. See, e.g., Indian Act, R.S.C. 1927, c. 98, s. 141. Policies and practices of 
assimilation and cultural erasure are perhaps best known with regards to the imposition of the 
Indian Residential School regime, the goal of which was described by Duncan Campbell Scott in 
his remarks to the special committee on the Indian Act in 1920 as a process that would lead to 
there not being “a single Indian in Canada that has not been absorbed into the body politic and 
there is no Indian question, and no Indian Department, that is the whole object of this Bill” (as 
quoted in E Brian Titley, A Narrow Vision: Duncan Campbell Scott and the Administration of 
Indian Affairs in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1986) at 50.)). While practice had been to 
force attendance, this practice was codified in 1920 with amendments to the Indian Act, s. 10(1). 
34  Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, vol. 3 (Ottawa: Communication 
Group, 1996) at 193. 
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assessment of traditional medicines in the recognition and protection of 
Aboriginal rights in health care.  
Canada has a long and unfortunate history in the use of state law and policy 
to oppress Indigenous peoples’ healing knowledge and practise, while foregoing 
its own legal duties to provide health support, as part of the larger colonial 
project to undermine Indigenous political and cultural identity. This history is 
not from the distant past, but known through lived memory, and directly 
experienced in the lives and deaths of Indigenous peoples.  
B. FEDERAL INTERVENTIONS IN INDIGENOUS 
HEALTH  
1. EARLY FEDERAL INTERVENTIONS IN HEALTH: 
DISCRETIONARY AND DISCRIMINATORY 
The state government’s actions to displace Indigenous healing included inserting 
its own vision of appropriate health support, which was both discretionary, thus 
attracting minimal accountability, and discriminatory, with the harms caused 
still ongoing.  
The federal Indian Act, which provides that the federal Governor in Council 
may make regulations “to provide medical treatment and health services for 
Indians”, suggested a significant role for the federal government in providing 
health care.35 This power, however, was never exercised. No regulations appear 
to have ever been passed. While disavowing any legal obligation to act, the 
dominion undertook — for what it characterized as humanitarian reasons — to 
provide limited and specific health supports for Indigenous peoples through 
internal policies.36  
Historically, the federal government would bring a physician on annual 
visits to reserve communities to pay treaty annuities. In the early 1900s, the 
Crown created an administrative structure to oversee some health care delivery 
on reserves.37 Access to these supports, however, was tied to registered “Indian” 
status under the legislated criteria of the Indian Act. As a result, between 1869                                                         
35  Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5, s. 73(1)(g). 
36  Constance MacIntosh, “Indigenous Peoples and Health Law and Policy: Responsibilities and 
Obligations” in Jocelyn Downie, Timothy Caulfield & Colleen M. Flood, eds., Canadian Health 
Law and Policy, 4th ed. (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2011) 575 at 592. See also Constance MacIntosh, 
“Jurisdictional Roulette: Constitutional and Structural Barriers to Aboriginal Access to Health” 
in Colleen M. Flood, ed., Just Medicare: What’s in, What’s Out, How We Decide (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2006) 193; Constance MacIntosh, “Indigenous Peoples and Mental 
Health: The Role of Law and Policy” in Jennifer A. Chandler & Colleen M. Flood, eds., Law 
and Mind: Mental Health Law and Policy in Canada (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2016) 419. 
37  James B. Waldram, D. Ann Herring & T. Kue Young, Aboriginal Health in Canada: Historical, 
Cultural and Epidemoligical Perspectives, 2d ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997) 
at 149-56. For a more in-depth description, see Constance MacIntosh, “Indigenous Peoples and 
Health Law and Policy: Responsibilities and Obligations” in Jocelyn Downie, Timothy Caulfield 
& Colleen M. Flood, eds., Canadian Health Law and Policy, 4th ed. (Toronto: LexisNexis, 
2011) 575 at 592-94. 
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and 1985, an Indigenous individual’s ability to access Indigenous-specific 
federal health supports turned on criteria unilaterally crafted by the federal 
government to determine if a person qualified for “status”. These criteria 
included gender, marital status, patrilineage and residence on reserve lands. 
With legislative changes in 1985, marital relationships became irrelevant and 
gender became far less relevant as a determinative factor for whether an 
individual would qualify for registered Indian status.38 
The mapping of the Indian Act’s registration criteria onto the right to access 
health and other services splintered First Nations communities. It also excluded 
other groups of Indigenous peoples such as the Metis from accessing federal 
health support. Provinces declined to fill the gap, seeing Aboriginal-specific 
health needs as within the scope of federal jurisdiction. Those who were outside 
of this regime were left in the same position as other provincial residents — who 
did not have provincially insured health coverage until at least 1962. While 
being in the same position as other provincial residents who also lacked access 
to publicly funded care may not seem egregious, this fact needs to be put into 
proper context. Traditional healing knowledges and practices that had served 
Indigenous peoples since time immemorial had been banned and morally 
condemned, yet the Canadian government did nothing to fill these health care 
gaps that it created. 
2. TRANSITIONING TO THE PRESENT: THE INDIAN HEALTH 
POLICY AND THE GOVERNANCE OF COMMUNITY CARE  
Pictou Landing Band Council v. Canada (Attorney General) is a case about 
Jeremy Meawasige, a severely disabled aboriginal teenager, diagnosed with 
hydrocephalus, cerebral palsy, spinal curvature and autism.39 Jeremy is in need 
of full-time personal care, which his mother Maurina Beadle, a Mi’kmaq 
resident of the Pictou Landing First Nation, provided until she suffered a stroke 
in 2010. Her First Nations band came to her assistance, covering $8,200 per 
month for Jeremy’s home care costs, almost 80 per cent of their home and 
community care budget for the whole community. The band asked the federal 
government for additional funding, but was refused. The federal government 
argued that pursuant to its various policies, it would not provide more than 
$2,200 per month if Maurina chose to keep her son at home with her. If she was 
willing, however, to place Jeremy in a provincial institution, federal government 
policies authorized coverage of the full costs, approximately $10,500 per month. 
The federal state continues to govern Indigenous health on a largely 
unilateral and discretionary basis, refusing to acknowledge any legal obligation                                                         
38  For a more detailed discussion of some of the harms which have resulted from this approach, see 
Constance MacIntosh, “Relational Theory and Indigenous Health: Insights for Law Reform and 
Policy” in Jocelyn G. Downie & Jennifer J. Llewellyn, eds., Being Relational: Reflections on 
Relational Theory and Health Law and Policy (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012) 230 at 238-246. 
39  [2013] F.C.J. No. 367, 2013 FC 342 (F.C.) (decision was appealed, and the appeal subsequently 
withdrawn).  
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to provide health support. Governance-through-policy creates minimal 
accountability and enables political whim to play a significant role in decision-
making and resource-allocation.40 This can have tragic consequences, including 
the removal of Aboriginal children from their homes as a condition of accessing 
necessary health care, thus perpetuating the assimilation goals which drove the 
residential school regime.  
In the late 1970s, the federal government sought to reduce its spending on 
Indigenous health, despite Indigenous health lagging far behind that of non-
Indigenous Canadians. This provoked a backlash, which culminated in the 1979 
Federal Indian Health Policy.41 The policy represents an important structural 
change in federal Indigenous health governance, namely Aboriginal self-
governance in health. The policy’s stated and admirable goal is to improve “the 
level of health in Indian communities, generated and maintained by Indian 
communities themselves”.42 Until the release of this policy, any Indigenous-
specific health care supports were designed and administered by the federal 
government, with little to no input from Indigenous peoples themselves. The 
policy’s language suggested that governance over the health of Indigenous 
peoples would be returned to their hands. This policy was followed by the 1988 
Federal Health Transfer Policy (“FTP”), under which control over the 
administration of federally created and delivered community health programs on 
reserves could be devolved or transferred to First Nations reserve communities. 
There are several types of agreements that the FTP contemplates, which 
involve the communities having greater or lesser discretion over the community 
health programs. 43  One type of agreement merely devolves administrative 
control for specific programs for one year with a pre-assigned budget. A second 
type has a three- to five-year span, permits the First Nation some scope to design 
new programs and comes with a general funding envelope. Communities who 
wish to enter this sort of arrangement, which is the most common, are required 
to also administer several programs including communicable disease control. 
The third type of agreement requires considerable capacity, as it involves 
designing and delivering programs as well as developing an over-arching health 
management scheme. 
Despite First Nation communities’ eager willingness to shoulder these 
governance responsibilities, the FTP is not without complications. First, the 
FTP, and indeed the Federal Indian Health Policy, still only contemplate                                                         
40  Constance MacIntosh, “Indigenous Mental Health: Imagining a Future where Action Follows 
Obligations and Promises” Alta. L. Rev. [forthcoming in 2017].  
41  Health Canada, Indian Health Policy 1979 (Canada: Health Canada Medical Services Branch, 
1979). 
42  Ibid.  
43  For a comprehensive description of these programs, see Constance MacIntosh, “Envisioning the 
Future of Aboriginal Health under the Health Transfer Process” (2008) Health L.J. 67 at 68-73. 
For commentary on the policy’s strengths and shortcomings, see Constance MacIntosh, 
“Indigenous Peoples and Health Law and Policy: Responsibilities and Obligations” in Jocelyn 
Downie, Timothy Caulfield & Colleen M. Flood, eds., Canadian Health Law and Policy, 4th ed. 
(Toronto: LexisNexis, 2011) 575 at 599-605. 
 The Governance of Indigenous Health 145 
supporting, for the most part, the heath of persons who live on First Nation 
reserves who also qualify for status under the Indian Act. Thus, this grant of 
modest health governance powers supports a particular perspective on what sort 
of Indigenous community counts as a political and cultural entity. It continues to 
splinter families and communities, and to support inequitable access to health 
care as between Indigenous individuals and even within families. 
The FTP also largely operates as a controlled administrative delegation, 
restricting the ability of First Nations communities to provide care on their own 
terms. The scope of what the community can do is strictly defined by the terms 
of the delegated program. Communities must fit their needs into the offered 
boxes. A variation exists in a few programs, where the communities can apply 
for short-term project-specific funding, where they must convince the federal 
government that their idea fits the scope of the program in question. This is how 
programming in areas including mental health and solvent abuse is developed 
and funded. 44  Clearly, community-generated ideas are likely relevant and 
culturally appropriate. Unfortunately, funding for such programs is available on 
a per capita basis, meaning that those communities who are doing well are able 
to direct their capped resources to primary interventions, while those 
communities which are currently struggling are likely to expend their allocation 
of resources coping with crisis situations and their fall-outs.45 The governance 
structure, which recognizes equity as advanced through a head count, rather than 
need, thus perpetuates inequalities between communities. 
Ironically, First Nation reserve communities have long been recognized by 
the federal government as having the power to act to improve health. The Indian 
Act delegates powers to band councils (which are the federally created and 
recognized governing body for First Nation communities) to pass regulations to 
“provide for the health of residents on the reserve and to prevent the spreading 
of contagious and infectious diseases”.46 Acting on this power, though, is limited 
due to the relative poverty of First Nation communities — thus it is the funding 
that accompanies the FTP that makes community self-governance in health a 
reality.  
The arbitrary if not discriminatory terms of health transfer agreements thus 
leave many communities struggling to support themselves. Maurina Beadle’s 
story is an example of one such struggle. Her community, Pictou Landing First 
Nation, had been devolved the power to administer home care support. Under 
the agreement, the community was required to administer the program, and the                                                         
44  Programming in these areas is possible through the Building Healthy Communities program, and 
the Brighter Futures Program. For a detailed discussion of these programs, see Constance 
MacIntosh, “Indigenous Peoples and Mental Health: The Role of Law and Policy” in Jennifer A. 
Chandler & Colleen M. Flood, eds., Law and Mind: Mental Health Law and Policy in Canada 
(Toronto: LexisNexis, 2016) 419.  
45  This concern was identified in 2003. It appears to have remained unaddressed. See Constance 
MacIntosh, “Indigenous Mental Health: Imagining a Future where Action Follows Obligations 
and Promises” Alta. L. Rev. [forthcoming in 2017]. 
46  Indian Act, R.S.C. 1958, c. I-5, s. 81(1)(a). 
146 Canadian Health Law and Policy 
federal government was required to fund it, in a manner that was consistent with 
or comparable to provincial standards.47 This pattern is common for many of the 
transferred or delegated programs. The federal commitment to support the 
community was, in principle, bolstered by a further commitment called 
“Jordan’s Principle”.48  
Jordan’s Principle was named after an Indigenous child named Jordan River 
Anderson, who had multiple disabilities and who spent the first few years of his 
life in a hospital, several hundred kilometres from his parents’ reserve home. 
When he was three-years-old, it was determined that he could be transferred to a 
home setting, and in particular into a home care setting operated by his family’s 
First Nations Band. The required home care supports were expensive, however, 
and although it was clear that state support was to be provided, both the federal 
government and the government of Manitoba denied jurisdictional responsibility 
for funding the supports. They fought over jurisdictional assignment until 
Jordan’s death, still in the hospital, two years later, at the age of five. He never 
returned home. 
Jordan’s story made its way to the House of Commons, which, in 2007, 
unanimously endorsed a motion called Jordan’s Principle. The heart of the 
principle is a commitment that Indigenous children are to receive the same 
standard of care as non-Indigenous children, and that this care will not be 
delayed due to jurisdictional uncertainty. Rather, if jurisdictional responsibility 
is unclear, the government that is first approached is required to take immediate 
funding responsibility, with any jurisdictional conflict to be worked out after the 
fact.49  
When the Pictou Landing Band Council approached the federal government 
for additional funding, consistent with provincial “extraordinary funding” 
guidelines, to cover the home care that Jeremy and his mother Maurina Beadle 
required, the federal government refused. It argued that the province had a 
policy of not providing extraordinary funding to status First Nation children on 
reserves, and so they could not do so as they were bound to follow provincial 
practices. (Such a policy presumably reflects the fact that provincial jurisdiction 
would not extend to such children.) The federal government also argued that it 
was bound by a provincial treasury board directive, which indicated that 
requests for extraordinary funding would not be approved. The directive in 
question was of no force, however, having recently been challenged in a 
provincial court, and found inconsistent with the legislated extraordinary                                                         
47  Pictou Landing Band Council v. Canada (Attorney General), [2013] F.C.J. No. 367, 2013 FC 
342 at para. 79 (F.C.). 
48  Adam Nathanson, “Legislating Jordan’s Principle: An Indirect Success” (2011) 34:3 Man. L.J. 
215; The Jordan’s Principle Working Group, Without denial, delay or disruption: Ensuring First 
Nations children’s access to equitable services through Jordan’s Principle (Ottawa: Assembly 
of First Nations, 2015).  
49  House of Commons Debates, 39th Parl., 2d Sess., Vol. 142, No. 31 (December 5, 2007) at 1730 
(Hon. Mario Laframboise), online: http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx? 
Doc=31&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=39&Pub=Hansard&Ses=2. 
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funding provisions.50 The federal government regarded itself as bound by the 
(non-enforceable) provincial directive, prohibiting it from funding extraordinary 
care for First Nations children residing on reserves. 
On judicial review of the federal government’s refusal, Mandamin J. 
expressed a level of astonishment at the government’s position. He ultimately 
concluded that the Federal government had wrongly exercised its discretion, had 
failed to fund in accordance with provincial standards and had violated Jordan’s 
Principle. Mandamin J. ordered that extraordinary funding be immediately 
provided.51 Jeremy remains in his home community, living with his mother, and 
receiving the same level of care that non-Indigenous children receive. Had it not 
been for his community’s willingness to fight, Jeremy, like Jordan, would have 
lived out his days in an institution. This is the capriciousness of governance 
through internally designed policy. 
Unfortunately, the underfunding of transferred community health programs 
appears to be an ongoing and widespread problem. Historic underfunding 
practices, for example, are perpetuated by community-health-funding envelopes 
being calibrated against factors such as the level of funding provided the year 
before the program was transferred to the community rather than on the basis of 
community need. Recommendations calling for funding formulas to be revisited 
have not been adopted. 52  Consequently, communities who transferred more 
recently receive considerably higher funding than those who transferred early in 
the history of the policy, revealed in support for health centres serving 
comparable communities ranging from $430 to $1,418 per capita.53 Moreover, 
communities still have limited ability to control programming from the bottom 
up. Communities find themselves administering community health programs 
that are seriously understaffed and underserviced, and which, as transferred 
programs that the federal government designed, are inadequate to meet actual 
needs and priorities. On this basis, the FTP fails international legal standards, 
which guarantee Indigenous peoples the right to “determine and develop 
priorities and strategies” for health, and that obligate states to “take the 
necessary steps” to progressively realize the “highest attainable standard of 
physical and mental health” for Indigenous peoples.54  
Indigenous peoples have been forced to turn to the courts to seek redress for 
human rights violations resulting from the federal underfunding of community 
health programs. Historically, provinces asserted that their child health and                                                         
50  Nova Scotia (Department of Community Services) v. Boudreau, [2011] N.S.J. No. 193, 2011 
NSSC 126 (N.S.S.C.). 
51  Pictou Landing Band Council v. Canada (Attorney General), [2013] F.C.J. No. 367, 2013 FC 
342 at para. 119 (F.C.).  
52  See, e.g., Health Canada, Management Action Plan — First Nations and Inuit Home and 
Community Care Summative Evaluation — March 2009 (October 16, 2009) at 1. 
53  Josee G. Lavoie, Evelyn Forget & John D. O’Neill, “Why Equity in Financing First Nations On-
Reserve Health Services Matters: Findings from the 2005 National Evaluation of the Health 
Transfer Policy” (2007) 2:4 Healthcare Policy 79 at 93. 
54  United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN GAOR, 61st Sess., Doc 
A/RES/61/295 (October 2, 2007) arts. 23, 24(2). 
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social welfare programs did not extend to reserves, because of section 91(24) 
placing “Indians” under federal jurisdiction. The federal government acted 
slowly to fill the need, and developed a policy-based program whose objective 
was to ensure First Nations children received culturally appropriate child 
welfare services reasonably comparative to services provided to other provincial 
residents. In practice, the federal government funds program delivery either 
through a local devolved First Nation child and family organization, or, if there 
is no such organization, through transferring funds to provincial/territorial child 
welfare agencies.  
In the First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada v. Canada 
(Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development) case, a claim was 
brought under the Canadian Human Rights Act 55  that the child and family 
services delivered through First Nations agencies on reserves were funded in a 
discriminatory manner.56 Among other evidence, it was determined that where 
provincial bodies delivered the services, they received two to four times more 
funding from the federal government than what First Nations were receiving to 
deliver the same services. Evidence also illustrated that the federal funding 
formulas provided a fixed sum to First Nation agencies — set in the 1990s — 
for supporting children who live with their families. This sum was far below 
actual need. However, the federal government’s practice was to provide the 
actual costs for supporting Indigenous children if they are removed from the 
home and placed into foster care. Thus the regime created a very real incentive 
for impoverished parents, and for First Nations agencies, to place Indigenous 
children into foster care. Once again, the system was structured to result in 
Indigenous children being under-served as long as they stayed with their 
families, with the capricious twist that the under-servicing was mitigated if the 
community did not try to self-administer but rather allowed the province to 
deliver aspects of the programming. 
The claim also argued that the federal government had inserted a 
wrongfully narrowed definition of Jordan’s Principle into its program manuals, 
namely that the principle only applied when multiple governments were 
involved and the child had multiple disabilities. 57  This approach varied 
considerably from the House of Commons motion that created the principle, 
which focused on Indigenous children being guaranteed the same standard of 
care as non-Indigenous children, and without delay. The federal government’s 
program definition resulted in delays in service access, and arbitrary and 
inequitable exercises of power. The Caring Society claims were successful. The 
federal government was ordered by the Human Rights Tribunal to immediately 
cease discriminating against First Nations children, comply with Jordan’s 
Principle and fund Indigenous children according to need and without delay.                                                          
55  R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6. 
56  [2016] C.H.R.D. No. 2, 2016 CHRT 2 (Canadian Human Rights Tribunal) [hereinafter “Caring 
Society”]. 
57  Ibid., at paras. 359-360.  
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Since the decision in Caring Society was released in January 2016, the 
Tribunal has twice issued compliance orders against Canada, and expressed 
concern that the ministry continues to redefine Jordan’s Principle.58 The federal 
government continues to not comply with several of the Tribunal’s orders. 
Rather, they schedule consultations with First Nations communities on matters 
such as determining the cost of living, while assigning only incremental 
increases in funding. 
The federal government’s position is that “[u]nilateral [federal] action … to 
decide how to address these important issues would be contrary to the 
Government’s commitment to . . . building a relationship based on recognition 
of rights, respect, cooperation and partnership”.59 Canada’s response has been 
widely perceived as disingenuous if not cruel given that as long as the 
underfunding persists, the economic discrimination pressures Aboriginal 
families to place their children into foster care. 
Despite the very real criticisms and concerns of discriminatory 
underfunding practices, the FTP and other delegations of governance in health 
have generally been associated with improving the health of Indigenous 
communities.60 Indeed, community control — over aspects of health and other 
significant areas such as education and child welfare — is itself appearing to be 
a co-relation of improved health.61 This begs the question of what communities 
could accomplish in terms of improving their health if they were not knowingly 
underfunded, and the governance structure truly supported Indigenous control 
over health programming. 
3. GOVERNANCE OF PRIMARY CARE AND HEALTH CARE 
BENEFITS 
Drianna Ross was a two-month-old First Nations girl from a remote northern 
Indigenous community. In 2011, she died from complications associated with a 
methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus (“MRSA”) infection, despite her 
parents repeatedly attending the nursing station that was created to serve their 
community, seeking assistance for Drianna’s extremely high fever and breathing 
difficulties. In the inquest following her death, testimony confirmed that, “in                                                         
58  Ibid., at para. 32. 
59  Ibid. Canadian Human Rights Tribunal, Respondent’s Further Reply Submissions re Immediate 
Relief, T-1340-7008 (July 6, 2016) at para. 23, online: https://fncaringsociety.com/sites/default/ 
files/Federal%20government%20compliance%20report_July%206%2C%202016.pdf. 
60  Paul Webster, “Local control over Aboriginal health care improves outcome, study indicates” 
(November 24, 2009) 181:11 C.M.A.J. E249. 
61  Josée Lavoie, et al., “The Where to Invest Project”(Centre for Aboriginal Health Research, 
2010) at v; Josée G. Lavoie, et al., “Have investments in on-reserve health services and 
initiatives promoting community control improved First Nations’ Health in Manitoba?” (August 
2010) 71:4 Soc. Sci. & Med. 717 at 723; Michael J. Chandler & Christopher E. Lalonde, 
“Cultural Continuity as a Moderator of Suicide Risk Among Canada’s First Nations” in 
Laurence J. Kirmayer & Gail Guthrie Valaskakis, eds., Healing Traditions: The Mental Health 
of Aboriginal People in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009) 221 at 238-40. 
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southern Canada, if a patient the same age as Drianna Ross had MRSA, they 
would be admitted to hospital and treated, whereas in the north, because of its 
prevalence, MRSA is frequently left untreated.” 62  Each time her parents 
attended the nursing station, they were sent home with the advice to try Tylenol 
and wait out the fever. Drianna never saw the only local physician. The nurse 
who saw Drianna indicated she had no experience with, nor education 
concerning, caring for such an ill infant. When Drianna was finally medivaced 
to a hospital, her accompanying records were incomplete and made no reference 
to her fever. Testimony at the inquest described the paper-based filing system at 
the nursing station as “atrocious” with frequent “confusion and errors with 
respect to medication and tests”.63 After being transferred, Drianna declined 
quickly, and died before appropriate intervention had ever commenced. No 
explanation was offered for why she was not assessed for a condition that was 
“prevalent” and “frequently left untreated” in her home community. While J.J.’s 
mother, D.H., fought to be outside of the western health care system, Drianna’s 
family sought care within that system and, despite all their actions, did not 
receive it. 
The inaccessibility that Drianna experienced is a consequence of an 
Indigenous health care governance regime characterized by gross underfunding, 
ineffective coordination and institutional practices which discriminate against 
Indigenous peoples by subjecting them to a standard of care in primary care that 
would be unacceptable in the Canadian south. The report of the inquest into 
Drianna’s death asserted that “the acceptance of MRSA as a fact of life in 
northern communities cannot be tolerated”.64   
Pursuant to the constitutional division of powers, provinces are responsible 
for providing physician services to provincial residents. When reserve 
communities are in remote areas, however, the federal government supports on-
reserve health care though nursing stations that have part-time physician-
coverage.65 These important services, however, are again managed by a web of 
policies, not laws or regulations, in a climate of underfunding. Part of the 
challenge is that when sound federal policies are enacted, they often sit 
unimplemented (or without the funding required to implement them available). 
The nursing station regime provides many examples of such situations. 
In recognition that nurses working at nursing stations may encounter 
emergencies or needs within their legislated scope of practice, but unlikely to be 
encountered in general training, Health Canada made it mandatory for such 
nurses to complete specialized courses in five specific areas.66 A 2010 internal 
Health Canada audit revealed that many of the Health Canada nurses staffing the                                                         
62  Provincial Court of Manitoba, Report on Inquest and Recommendations of The Honourable 
Judge Don Slough (December 17, 2015) at para. 25. 
63  Ibid., at para. 19. 
64  Ibid., at para. 27. 
65  Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Reports of the Auditor General of Canada: Report 4 —
Access to Health Services for Remote First Nations Communities (Spring 2015) at paras. 4.1, 4.6. 
66  Ibid., at paras. 4.24-4.26. 
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stations had not received the mandatory training. A 2015 audit by the Auditor 
General of Canada surveyed 45 Health Canada nurses in Manitoba and Ontario, 
and found that only 1 of the 45 surveyed nurses had completed all five of the 
mandatory courses. Such a situation would likely incur federal liability had it 
elevated the mandatory policy to a legislated requirement. The nurse who treated 
Dianna indicated in the Inquiry that she never received training on Pediatric 
Advanced Life Support, one of the five mandatory courses. She simply was not 
trained to care for an infant as ill as Drianna. 
A not dissimilar situation has arisen with essential services. In 2013, Health 
Canada identified and defined “essential health services” for each remote 
nursing station it oversees. The assessment was nursing-station specific, and 
related to factors such as the size of the community and its health needs. 
However, Health Canada did not determine if the stations were capable of 
actually delivering the services that it had labeled “essential” and therefore did 
not assess if additional funding, staff, equipment or training was required to 
build their capacity. Nor did Health Canada inform the relevant First Nation 
community of the defined services that they could expect to receive, effectively 
disabling the communities for calling the government to account for its failure.67 
Unlike essential services in a provincial setting, there is no overarching 
legislation requiring their delivery, nor articulating consequences for a failure to 
deliver them. The administration of essential health services by internal policies 
rather than legal regulation avoids accountability and does not enable a clear 
means to enforce compliance. Essentially, much of the work of governing health 
care in Indigenous communities operates outside the rule of law.  
Another route by which the federal government provides direct support for 
status First Nation individuals to access primary care is through the Non-Insured 
Health Benefits Program (“NIHB”). This program has been in place for several 
decades, and was developed to supplement the health care benefits that are 
provided by provinces to all provincial residents. It essentially mirrors the sorts 
of additional health-related expenses that are usually covered by provinces for 
persons receiving social assistance, such as prescription medicines, medical 
devices, eyeglasses and dental work. The NIHB, like the FTP, was designed 
without Indigenous input, and exists only as a policy grounded in no recognized 
legal obligation by the federal government.  
The receipt of benefits under the NIHB program, however, is once again 
tied to registered status under the Indian Act. During the inquest into Drianna’s 
death, testimony was offered evidencing an inability of First Nations persons 
living in remote communities to access NIHB benefits due to complications 
surrounding registering for Indian status, a claim that was confirmed in a 2015 
audit by the Auditor General of Canada.68 Metis and non-Status First Nations 
persons are also excluded from the NIHB and other such federal benefits 
programs on the basis that they do not qualify to be registered as Indians under                                                         
67  Ibid., at paras. 4.57-4.63. 
68  Ibid., at para. 4.79. 
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the terms of the Indian Act. Provincial governments, with the exception of 
Alberta for Metis peoples and Ontario for all Aboriginal peoples, have resisted 
Aboriginal-specific programming on the basis that Aboriginal people fall under 
federal jurisdiction (i.e., that the federal distinction between registered First 
Nations and other Aboriginal peoples is legally incorrect).  
Metis and non-status First Nations persons have persisted in advancing 
arguments that tying health benefits to status under the Indian Act is arbitrary 
and unjust, violates their Charter69 rights as well as international law, and has 
been a cause in their continuing poor health status. They have long sought 
inclusion in the Aboriginal-specific programming and policies offered to status 
First Nations persons, despite the flaws in those programs. The Supreme Court 
of Canada recently agreed that the federal government’s position was wrong. 
Justice Abella, writing for the court in Daniels v. Canada (Indian Affairs 
and Northern Development), found that non-status First Nations persons and 
Metis persons count as “Indians” for the purposes of the Indian Act.70 The case 
had been framed in terms of a request for declarations. The federal government 
argued a declaration should not be issued because it would have no practical 
utility in that a finding of federal jurisdiction would not create a legally 
enforceable duty to legislate or act. Justice Abella was not convinced. She found 
that declarations would have practical utility because the consequence of both 
federal and provincial governments denying legislative authority for Metis and 
non-status First Nations persons has been to leave them in a jurisdictional 
wasteland. The court endorsed the following findings of the trial judge, Phelan J.  
One of the results of the positions taken by the federal and provincial 
governments and the “political football — buck passing” practices is that 
financially [Métis and non-status Indians] have been deprived of significant 
funding for their affairs … . 
… the political/policy wrangling between the federal and provincial 
governments has produced a large population of collaterally damaged [Métis 
and non-status Indians]. They are deprived of programs, services and intangible 
benefits recognized by all governments as needed.71 
Justice Abella was clear in her reasons that she expected the declaration to 
compel action. She wrote that issuing a declaration would ensure 
“accountability”,72 and that the clear assignment of constitutional jurisdiction 
would “have enormous practical utility” for Metis and Non-Status First Nations 
persons, who have had “to rely more on noblesse oblige than on what is obliged 
by the Constitution”.73 She also found it was beyond doubt that a fiduciary                                                         
69  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule 
B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
70  [2016] S.C.J. No. 12, 2016 SCC 12 (S.C.C.). 
71  Ibid., at para. 14, citing the trial decision at paras. 107-108. 
72  Ibid., at para. 15. 
73  Ibid., at para. 12. 
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relationship exists between all Indigenous peoples and the Crown,74 and referred 
to the constitutionally entrenched obligation on the part of Parliament to seek 
“reconciliation with all of Canada’s Aboriginal peoples”.75 It is evident that the 
court expected the declaration to result in Metis and non-status First Nations 
persons finally receiving federal support for their health care needs.  
C. PROVINCIAL AND INDIGENOUS GOVERNANCE 
INITIATIVES  
Historic approaches to Indigenous health governance were characterized by 
prejudice in design and capriciousness in delivery, along with unilateral state 
control. Although these approaches continue, they now operate in concert with 
First Nations communities administering programs and, in some instances, 
designing program content as well. There is also a growing transition toward 
substantive Indigenous control over health care design and delivery. That is, 
broad-scale Indigenous governance or co-governance over Indigenous health. 
These include treaties and provincial regimes.  
1. SELF-GOVERNMENT AGREEMENTS AND JURISDICTION 
OVER HEALTH 
Band councils have long had authority under the Indian Act to pass by-laws 
concerning health, but this power has had restricted value in practice due to 
factors such as bands lacking independent funding and limited scope to address 
infractions.76 Where self-government agreements are negotiated, on the other 
hand, communities receive considerable cash transfers for compensation, along 
with enhanced control over resources and development on traditional lands — 
thus opening up independent revenue sources. In self-government agreements, 
communities are released from the Indian Act. They can restructure their 
relationship with the province and the federal government, and explicitly claim 
jurisdictional space for themselves over matters including health care.  
The Nisga’a Treaty (which became effective in 2000) recognizes the right 
of the Nisga’a Lisims Government to “make laws in respect of health services 
on Nisga’a land”,77 with any conflict between Nisga’a law and provincial or 
federal law concerning organization and delivery structure resulting in Nisga’a 
law prevailing.78 Where the Nisga’a Treaty approaches health through general or 
blanket provisions, the more recent Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement 
from 2005 sets out detailed terms regarding the power of the Nunatsiavut 
Government regarding health. It recognizes the right to the Nunatsiavut                                                         
74  Ibid., at para. 53. 
75  Ibid., at para. 37. 
76  Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5, s. 81(1)(a). 
77  Nisga’a Final Agreement (April 27, 1999) at c. 11, s. 82, online: http://www.nnkn.ca/files/u28/ 
nis-eng.pdf [hereinafter “Nisga’a Treaty”]. 
78  Ibid., at c. 11, s. 84. 
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Government to make laws concerning, for example, requirements for obtaining 
informed consent from Inuit for medical care, the provision of mental health 
support services and the creation of community health programs as well as 
injury prevention, disease control and environmental health. 79  There do not 
appear to have been implementation evaluations, nor any litigation concerning 
health services under such agreements. It is challenging to determine whether or 
how these agreements have enhanced health and well-being. Insofar as they 
seem to align with realizing indigenous governance rights under international 
law, they are clearly a positive development. 
2. LARGE-SCALE PROVINCIAL APPROACHES 
Both British Columbia and Ontario have advanced province-wide initiatives, 
which stand as contrasting examples. Ontario is identified as model for how 
provincial governments can create governance structures that can broadly 
support Indigenous health.80 Ontario’s approach is structured to be inclusive and 
to involve broad Indigenous representation on decision-making bodies. Ontario 
launched an Aboriginal Healing and Wellness Strategy (“AHWS”) in 1994, 
seeking to develop culturally appropriate programs and services to address poor 
experiences of health and also high levels of family violence.81 They did not 
exclude individuals from the strategy, or deny them services, based on factors 
such as whether the individual had registered Indian status. Their programs, 
located both on and off reserves, include healing lodges, youth treatment 
centres, mental health programs and family violence programs; they directly 
serve approximately 42,000 individuals annually. 
Until 2010, the AHWS was overseen by a Joint Management Committee 
that included Indigenous political representatives from urban, rural and remote 
First Nations, Metis and Inuit.82 After this time, the structure shifted due to 
Ontario developing Local Health Integration Networks, which were responsible 
for regional decisions, and which would also include an Aboriginal Health 
Council. In all cases, the governing bodies are to adhere to Ontario’s Aboriginal 
Health Policy. This policy has been described as the most comprehensive policy 
currently in place in Canada to address Indigenous health, covering matters 
including:                                                         
79  Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement (January 22, 2005), s. 17.13.1, online https://www.aadnc- 
aandc.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-INTER-HQ/STAGING/texte-text/al_ldc_ccl_fagr_labi_labi_13070374 
70583_eng.pdf. (the Agreement became law with the passage of the Labrador Inuit Land Claims 
Agreement Act, S.C. 2005, c. 27). 
80  Josée G. Lavoie, et al., “Missing Pathways to Self-Governance: Aboriginal Health Policy in 
British Columbia” (2015) 6:1 The International Indigenous Policy Journal, Article 2 at 10.  
81  Ontario, Minister of Community and Social Services “Backgrounder: Ontario’s Aboriginal 
Healing and Wellness Strategy” (November 20, 2014), online: https://news.ontario.ca/mcss/ 
en/2014/11/ontarios-aboriginal-healing-and-wellness-strategy.html. 
82  Josée G. Lavoie, et al., “Missing Pathways to Self-Governance: Aboriginal Health Policy in 
British Columbia” (2015) 6:1 The International Indigenous Policy Journal art. 2 at 11.  
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… accessing inequities in Aboriginal health programming, responding to 
Aboriginal priorities, adjusting existing programs to respond more effectively 
to needs, supporting the reallocation of resources to Aboriginal initiatives, and 
improving interactions and collaboration between ministry branches … .83 
Ontario’s approach has been contrasted with the recent innovations arising in 
British Columbia. British Columbia’s 2005 Transformative Change Accord and 
the First Nations Health Plan84 set a course for supporting First Nations persons 
with registered Indian status, but did not embrace the larger Indigenous 
community. Various framework agreements were negotiated, and a First Nations 
Health Authority (“FNHA”) was created. The focus that emerged was 
transferring control and funding for existing federally designed health programs 
to the new FNHA. For example, funding and authority to administer the NIHB 
Program was transferred, along with the community health programs under 
which communities could seek project-specific funding, such as the National 
Aboriginal Youth Suicide Prevention Strategy and the Aboriginal Diabetes 
Initiative.85 The FNHA is considered to hold promise for improving the health of 
British Columbian status First Nations persons by virtue of being run by First 
Nations.86 It is troubling that the approach seems to follow the federal transfer 
model, a model that has been critiqued as only enabling self-administration, 
continuing the situation where policy is made for and not by First Nations, and 
the entity seems to exist more as a service-delivery organization than a political 
one. It is also troubling because of the continuing exclusion of non-status First 
Nations persons and Metis people, who remain invisible as Aboriginal peoples. 
D. CONTEMPORARY GOVERNANCE OF 
TRADITIONAL HEALERS AND ABORIGINAL 
MIDWIVES  
Aboriginal healing practices are today governed by a multitude of approaches 
that reflect different power dynamics and different levels of recognition of 
Aboriginal healing traditions as a part of the broader healthcare system.  
Canada’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission recently criticized the 
marginalization of Aboriginal healing practices in the Canadian health care 
system, and called for the system “to recognize the value of Aboriginal healing 
practices and use them in the treatment of Aboriginal patients in collaboration                                                         
83  National Collaborating Centre for Aboriginal Health, Looking for Aboriginal Health in 
Legislation and Policies, 1970 to 2008: The Policy Synthesis Project, (June 2011) at 29, online: 
http://www.nccah-ccnsa.ca/docs/Looking%20for%20Aboriginal%20Health%20in%20Legislation 
%20and%20Policies%20-%20June%202011.pdf. 
84  http://www.nccah-ccnsa.ca/docs/social%20determinates/FirstNationsHealthImplementationPlan 
_Combo_LowRes.pdf 
85  First Nations Health Authority, “What We Do: Funding Arrangements” (2017), online: 
http://www.fnha.ca/what-we-do/funding-arrangements. 
86  Joe Gallagher, Joseph Kiet Mendez & Trevor Kehoe, “The First Nations Health Authority: A 
transformation in healthcare for BC First Nations” (2015) 28:6 Healthcare Management Forum 
255. 
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with Aboriginal healers and Elders where requested by Aboriginal patients”.87 
This call to action was one of the many items that the Commission concluded 
was necessary to build a new relationship of mutual respect and understanding 
between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples, as part of dismantling the 
colonial relationship and the harm it caused and continues to perpetuate.  
Indigenous healing practices currently occupy an inconsistent position in 
provincial and territorial legislation, although they are no longer the targets of 
criminal sanction. Ontario is illustrative of a common approach across much of 
Canada. Ontario simply excludes traditional Aboriginal healers and midwives 
from any provincial professional regulation.88 The lack of regulation could be 
read, on the one hand, as a reflection of the inability (or illegitimacy) of state 
bodies to determine standards of practice and thus deferring to Indigenous 
peoples or communities on practice standards. On the other hand, some have 
cautioned that “many Aboriginal people and health professionals do not have the 
traditional knowledge necessary to distinguish a traditional healer from a 
charlatan.”89 One obvious consequence of Ontario’s regulatory approach is that 
it makes no attempt to bring Aboriginal healers into dialogue with other health 
care providers. 
A few provinces are completely silent on traditional healers.90 As a result, in 
provinces such as British Columbia, for example, it may be an offence for an 
Aboriginal person to engage in traditional healing practices. One would expect 
that such a charge would be answered with a section 3591 defence, but it does 
seem odd that provincial legislators fail to even acknowledge that such practices 
exist. 
In the case of midwives, we see a different approach. Many provinces have 
chosen to ensure Indigenous representation in the representative colleges. For 
example, the by-laws of the College of Midwives of Manitoba require a standing 
committee that advises on midwifery care for Aboriginal women (called the 
Kagike Danikobidan), and all of the members of that committee must be 
Aboriginal.92 This committee, in turn, appoints one of its members to the Board 
                                                        
87  Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, Calls to Action (Winnipeg: 2015) at para. 22, 
online at: <http://www.trc.ca/websites/trcinstitution/File/2015/Findings/Calls_to_Action_ 
English2.pdf>. 
88  For example, Regulated Health Professions Act, S.O. 1991, c. 18, s. 35(1), does not apply to 
“aboriginal healers and midwives”. This stands in contrast to other non-Western healing 
practices which are regulated in Ontario; see Traditional Chinese Medicine Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, 
c. 27. 
89  Marion A. Maar & Marjory Shawande, “Traditional Anishinabe Healing in a Clinical Setting: 
The Development of an Aboriginal Interdisciplinary Approach to Community-based Aboriginal 
Mental Health Care” (2010) J. of Aboriginal Health 18 at 20. 
90  British Columbia’s Health Professions Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 183 does not carve out an 
exception for Aboriginal traditional healers, nor does there appear to be any stand-alone 
legislation. 
91  Constitution Act, 1982, s. 35.  
92  The by-laws exist under the Midwifery Act, C.C.S.M., c. M125. 
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of Assessors, the Standards Committee and the Council of the College.93 If 
Kagike Danikobidan disagrees with a Council decision, they have the power to 
require a reconsideration and bring in a mediator.94  
Nunavut’s approach goes a step further by requiring all continuing 
education programs and professional development programs to include 
instruction in “traditional Inuit midwifery knowledge, skills and judgment”. 95 
The legislation contemplates a role for this material in the basic training 
program as well. Thus midwives are not deemed competent unless they have 
been trained in Indigenous practices. 
Where communities have entered into self-government agreements, the 
trend seems to be that the communities seize explicit jurisdiction to regulate 
traditional healers and their standards of practice. For example, the Tsawwassen 
First Nation Final Agreement recognizes the First Nation as having law-making 
authority over Aboriginal healers, which prevail over any inconsistent provincial 
or federal laws, and to establish standards of practice and codes of ethics.96 The 
Miawpukek First Nation’s Self-Government Agreement-in-Principle requires it 
to define qualifications that include “standards … of competence, ethics and 
quality of practice that are reasonably required to protect the public” and 
safeguard confidentiality.97 
The regulation of traditional practices in Yukon appear to already align with 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s Call to Action. Its legislation 
embraces and promotes Indigenous healing practices. In particular, the 
legislation includes a provision to protect Aboriginal practices “as a viable 
alternative for seekers of health and healing services”, and also mandates the 
Minister to “promote mutual understanding, knowledge, and respect between the 
providers of health” offered in the health care systems “and the providers of 
traditional aboriginal nutrition and healing”.98 Such legislation is an explicit 
rejection of colonial practice. This raises the question of whether the relationship 
between J.J. and her mother, and the health care team and the hospital would 
have been as confrontational had such legislation been in place in Ontario.                                                         
93  These are pursuant to the College of Midwives of Manitoba, Bylaw No. 1 (as amended January 
28, 2010), ss. 9.1(b), 16.12(a), 14.1, 15.1, 16.13, online: http://www.midwives.mb.ca/docs/cmm-
by-laws-2011.pdf. 
94  Ibid., at 8.9. 
95  Midwifery Profession Act, S.Nu. 2008, c. 18, s. 6.1. 
96  Tsawwassen First Nation Final Agreement (2007), c. 15, ss. 85, 87, 88, online: www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100022706/1100100022717. There are analogous provisions in other self-
government agreements, for example, Westbank First Nation Self-Government Agreement 
(2003), Part XVII, s. 193, online: https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100031766/ 
1100100031768#chp17; Yale First Nation Final Agreement (2011), s. 3.17.4, online: 
https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1336657835560/1336658472497; Tla'amin Final Agreement 
(2014), c. 15, s. 85, online: https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1397152724601/1397152939293. 
97  Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, Miawpukek First Nation Self-Government Agreement-
in-Principle (2013) at 8.9(a), online: https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1402322568771/ 
1402322859715#chp8. 
98  Yukon Health Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 106, s. 5(1), (2). 
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E. CONCLUSION 
Indigenous health care is poorly governed and the site of considerable political 
tension. This is evidenced by the arbitrary way in which policies are often 
designed, the patchwork manner in which care is delivered, the scarcity of 
mechanisms to foster legal accountability and the Indigenous parties turning to 
litigation to address discrimination. These failings, in turn, manifest in the lives 
and deaths of Indigenous individuals. Exceptions to these generalizations are 
present. More emerge as Indigenous communities partner with provinces or 
otherwise take governing roles, and new legal and practice norms emerge. 
 
